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Abstract
I analyze the optimal design of banking supervision in the presence of cross-border lending.
Cross-border lending could imply that an individual bank failure in one country could trigger
negative spillover effects in another country. Such cross-border contagion effects could turn
out to be important in the EU because national banking problems could easily spread via the
highly integrated interbank market. I show that if benevolent supervisors are accountable only
to their own jurisdiction, they will not take cross-border contagion effects into account.
Supervisors with such a national mandate fail to implement the optimum from a supranational
perspective. In consequence, the probability of a bank failure will be inefficiently high.
Against the background of this result, I argue in favor of institutionalizing an EU
”Supervisory Coordination Authority” to which national supervisors are accountable.
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Besides the aim of protecting small depositors, controlling systemic risk is
cited as one of the main arguments for banking regulation and supervision.
Systemic risk is the probability that the failure of one single bank leads
to successive losses along the chain of institutions with negative impact on
the whole economy.1 The higher the interconnections within the banking
system, the higher are the subsequent losses after an individual bank failure.
As ﬁnancial markets have increasingly become integrated across national
borders, these losses can partially incur outside the country where the bank
failure took place. This contagion eﬀect is particularly relevant in Europe
where the highly integrated interbank market could function as a channel for
cross-border spillovers.
As banks are not liable to losses incurred by their bankruptcy, they do not
account for losses of their direct stakeholders nor the just described negative
eﬀects further down the chain when deciding on their investment strategy.
In the absence of regulation, the probability of failure is, thus, assumed to
be ineﬃciently high. Hence, regulators employ their instruments in order
to increase social welfare. Among the regulatory tools, capital requirements
currently seem to be the most accepted instrument.2 In order to ensure com-
pliance with the imposed rules, supervisors monitor banks and take counter-
measure in case of deviation.
In the EU, it is the ”home country” which has full responsibility for
banking supervision of individual banks. This national approach means that
supervisors are accountable to their own jurisdiction and that their mandate
is to guarantee prudential behavior of home banks and to safeguard systemic
stability in their own country. Accordingly, incentives are such that supervi-
sors use their discretion to follow national interests. This institutional design
has two consequences for the national supervisors’ behavior. First, supervi-
sors will pay attention only to the repercussions the failure of a ﬁnancial
institution has on the own economy. However, they will disregard the poten-
tial negative eﬀects which are transmitted into other EU countries via the
highly integrated interbank market. Second, although supervisors would like
to take the risks into account which derive from the bank’s activity abroad,
they may lack information to do so as their foreign colleagues do not have
incentives to deliver the necessary data on the bank’s activities abroad.
1There is no generally accepted deﬁnition of systemic risk (see Summer (2002) for a
survey). My deﬁnition comes closest to Kaufman ’s (1995) one (p. 47).
2Capital requirements are seen as providing a ”buﬀer” in bad times and preventing
banks from risk-taking ex ante. See, for instance, Rochet (1992) and Dewatripont and
Tirole (1993).
2This incentive or information deﬁcit implies that national authorities
try to optimize supervision without taking negative eﬀects on or deriving
from other EU countries into consideration. This national approach does not
achieve eﬃcient supervision from the perspective of an overall EU optimum as
the probability of failure will be ineﬃciently high. And as increasing integra-
tion renders cross-country aspects more important, the current supervisory
regime will increasingly deviate from the EU optimum.
In order to adequately align supervisors’ incentives, crossborder coordi-
nation of supervision has to be implemented. The current devices to arrange
bilateral cooperation in practice are Memoranda of Understanding. However,
they fail to make supervisors account for foreign externalities as sanctions
are missing for the case supervisors do not do so. Thus, I argue in favor
of further tightening coordination among national supervisory authorities.
Tighter coordination could most eﬀectively be achieved by means of an EU
”Supervisory Coordination Authority” to which national supervisors would
be accountable. Such an authority would review and evaluate national su-
pervisory procedures. In case of disapproval, adequate sanctions would have
to be designed to guarantee compliance which the supranational scheme. In
order to minimize political opposition to delegate sovereign rights to the EU,
the new committee could be based at a well-established instance with rep-
u t a t i o ni nt h eﬁeld of supervision. Hence, I bring forward the argument
that the current mandate of the Banking Supervision Committee, located at
t h eE u r o p e a nC e n t r a lB a n k ,s h o u l db ee x p a n d e di ns u c haw a yt h a ti tc a n
function as a guiding instance for the national supervisory authorities.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I give details on the
institutional design of supervision in the EU. In section 3, building on earlier
work by Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993), I develop an analytical
framework to study how a benevolent regulator-supervisor would optimally
regulate and monitor a bank which is prone to moral hazard. In section 4, I
deduce the optimal regulatory and supervisory scheme for a closed banking
system. In section 5, I show how a nationally optimal regulatory and super-
visory regime deviates from the international optimum. In section 6, I draw
conclusions for the optimal supervisory design within the EU. In section 7, I
conclude.
2 Implementation of Supervision in the EU
In the EU, capital regulation is implemented on a supranational level: The
Basel Capital Accord of 1988 has come into eﬀect via the Solvency Ratio
(89/647/EEC) and Own Funds (89/299/EEC) directives and is, thus, bind-
3ing for all member states. The new Capital Accord (Basel II) will also be
implemented via EU legislation. Like its predecessor, Basel II focuses on the
calculation of risk-based capital requirements. Besides, Basel II assigns an
important role to supervisors who control the banks’ compliance with these
rules and take countermeasure in case of deviation. In order to strengthen
their powers, the new accord intends to give supervisors more leeway to use
instruments they consider appropriate.3
In contrast to the supranational approach to regulation, supervision stays
with national authorities.4 In the EU, this national approach of supervision
is implemented by the home country principle which assigns responsibility
for overseeing banks to the national authority in the banks’ home country.
Furthermore, the principle of consolidated supervision requires that the home
supervisor is not only liable for a national bank’s activities inside the coun-
try’s borders, but for the control of the whole ﬁnancial group. However, in
practice, banking supervisors in the EU cooperate bilaterally on the basis of
so called Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). These serve to specify the
cooperation between supervisors as envisaged in the Second Banking Coor-
dination Directive. MoUs typically include practical provisions with regard
to the exchange of information.
As I will argue, this national approach to supervision will not imple-
ment an overall EU optimum when an individual bank failure in one country
could trigger negative spillover eﬀects in another country. Cross-border es-
tablishments and the interbank market are the most probable channels for
inter-country contagion. With respect to cross-border establishments, one
ﬁnds that market shares of foreign banks are extremely high for Ireland and
the UK, but remain moderate for most EU countries (see Figure 1). Hence,
this channel may gain relevance in the future, but is currently not the most
probable one.
In contrast, integration of the interbank market seems rather complete.
The largest part of total interbank activity in euro, namely 70%, takes place
in the interbank market for unsecured deposits.5 The TARGET system is
the primary channel for conducting and settling these unsecured interbank
transactions in the EU. The TARGET statistics of May 2002 show that the
share of cross-border payments in all payments is 21.9 % in volume and 31.1
% in value. Onother observation is the emergance of a ”tiered” interbank
3The proposal for Basel II states that ”supervisors should have the discretion to use
the tools best suited to the circumstances of the bank and its operating environment.”
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001), p.31.
4See the Economic and Financial Committee (2000) for further details on the current
EU framework of supervision.
5See Santillan, Bayle, and Thygesen (2000).























































































































































































































Figure 2: Composition of Daily TARGET Transactions
189,868 5.59 Mio. Euro Domestic transfers





189,868 5.59 Mio. Euro Domestic transfers





Source: ECB TARGET Statistics May 2002
market structure: The daily cross-border interbank transfers are on average
signiﬁcantly larger than the domestic ones while the number of transactions
is substantially smaller (see Figure 2). This ﬁnding is interpreted such that
some large banks start to act as ”money centre” banks which are active in
the whole euro area while smaller banks continue to operate nationally.6 As
these ”money centre” banks form the backbone of the interbank market,
ﬁnancial problems of one of them could easily spread across borders particu-
larly as the interbank market is characterized by large volumes and absence
of guarantees. Hence, the interbank market is particularly prone to being a
channel for cross-border contagion in the EU.
6See Enria and Vesala (2002).
53O u t l i n e o f t h e M o d e l
While banking regulation and banking supervision are generally regarded as
having the same objective, it should be remarked that they are diﬀerent in
that ”regulation deals with the formation of rules (... whereas) supervision
deals with the enforcement of rules both ex ante (control) and ex post (sanc-
tions)”.7 According to Basel II, supervisors will have discretion to use tools
such as requiring the bank to hold more capital. However, when a supervisor
has such wide competencies, he actually acts as a regulator. In this sense,
regulation and supervision are often indistinguishable. Hence, regulator and
supervisor are modelled as one institution and both expressions are used as
synonyms.
The regulator’s aim is to maximize social welfare. Banks provide two
socially valuable services. First, they take in retail and interbank deposits
which are liquid and, thus, valuable to depositors who are assumed to have a
preference for liquidity. Second, banks invest these proceeds in risky retail or
interbank loans. Limited liability is assumed so that banks are only interested
in cash ﬂows which accrue in states other than bankruptcy. This convex
pay-oﬀ structure encourages banks to increase asset risk, which increases
the expected pay-oﬀ. Due to this classical moral hazard problem, banks
are not interested in employing costly resources in order to lower the risk
associated with its loan portfolio. However, such a reduction in portfolio risk
would lower the probability of failure and, hence, the probability of losses to
depositors and of negative systemic impacts.
The regulator’s problem guides my model construction. Many details are
borrowed from Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993) (from now on,
referred to as GLS). However, my focus is diﬀerent: In GLS, the regulator
tries to balance the interests of the bank against the interest of the deposit
insurance which is funded via distortionary taxes. In contrast, I assume
the absence of deposit insurance. Hence, bankruptcy can trigger losses to
depositors and systemic costs along the chain of banks which the regulator
is concerned to balance against bank proﬁts.
In my model, there are four classes of risk-neutral actors: (1) retail depos-
itors with wealth which can be invested or loaned, (2) companies which seek
loans to ﬁnance projects, (3) banks that provide intermediation services and
are active in the interbank market, and (4) a benevolent regulator-supervisor
who maximizes social welfare. More details are provided in the following.
7See Di Giorgio and Di Noia (2001).
63.1 Investors/Depositors
Investors can either invest in illiquid securities (shares of the bank) or liquid
assets (deposits). They know that a limited-liablity bank has the incentive to
reduce portfolio quality at the expense of depositors (see Jensen and Meckling
(1976)). They would anticipate this behavior and demand higher deposit
rates. The breakeven return for the bank rises. The bank would, thus,
have higher incentive to decrease quality, thereby, increasing the expected
pay-oﬀ.I nt h ew o r s tc a s e ,t h em a r k e tf o rd e p o s i t sw o u l db r e a kd o w n .T h e
bank could also try to credibly commit itself to a speciﬁed quality level
in order to lower its deposit rates. However, agency costs would accrue.
The existence of a regulator-supervisor simpliﬁes this interaction. He forces
the limited-liability bank to take the depositors’ losses into account which
accrue in case of bankruptcy. Investors are assumed to be indiﬀerent between
illiquid equity oﬀering an expected rate of return of re and liquid deposits.
Depositors demand a ﬁxed deposit rate, which I normalize to zero. As in case
of bankruptcy, depositors receive less than the amount initially deposited in
t h eb a n k ,t h ee x p e c t e dr a t eo fr e t u r no nd e p o s i t si sl e s st h a no n e .T oc a p t u r e
the preference of investors for liquidity most simply, I assume that re > 1.
3.2 Companies
Companies need funding from the bank to ﬁnance their investment projects.
I assume that banks are the only source of companies’ funding and have all
the bargaining power in negotiating ﬁnancing with the companies. Banks
can, thus, capture as proﬁt all the expected surplus from the loans.
3.3 Banks
At the start of the model, just prior to t0, the bank has one outstanding
share and has no outstanding deposits. The bank’s only asset is access to
a segment of risky loans on the retail and interbank market with an innate
quality of q0. The objective of the bank is to maximize the value of its initial
equity share, its initial wealth. At t0, provided it has complied with the rules
established by the regulator, the bank can raise funds in the form of outside
equity E (a fraction z of the bank’s equity) and retail and interbank deposits
D.
The banks will then invest the proceeds L = E+D in loans to companies.
The portfolio size L is given by the market and is, thus, not subject to
neither the bank’s nor the regulator’s decision. The innate quality of the
risky projects is q0 with q0 ∈ [q,q] and the average rate of return on all
7loans L of the bank is r. The bank is able to raise the quality of its loan
portfolio e units above q0 if it devotes resources to this purpose with a cost
of C(e). I assume that dC/de > 0 and d2C/de2 > 0. The level of quality
achieved by the bank is q = q0 + e. The quality of the loan portfolio has
an inﬂuence on the distribution of returns G(r|q). Higher levels of q will
be assumed to shift the distribution of returns in the sense of either ﬁrst-
or second-order stochastic dominance. Analytically, the underlying density
function is assumed to have positive support on [r,r] and:
(FOSD) Gq(r|q) ≤ 0 ∀r ∈ [r,r] with strict inequality for some r;o r
(SOSD)
R y
r Gq(r|q)dr ≤ 0 ∀∈[r,r] with strict inequality for some y.
At time t1, the cash ﬂows are collected, which consist of the average gross
return rL less the cost γ(L) of processing L a n dl e s st h eo w e dp a y m e n tt o
depositors D. Limited liability of banks is assumed. Hence, deposits D are
serviced ﬁrst. Outside shareholders receive a proportion z of the residual.
The rest goes to the owner of the initial share. In case of bankruptcy, the
bank is closed and equity holders receive nothing. The whole cash ﬂows go
to depositors who have to bear the residual loss.
Given the investment and ﬁnancing opportunities available to the bank,
















(rL− γ(L) − ρ(q)D)dG(r|q) (3)
and the cash ﬂow constraint
L = D + E.( 4 )




(rL− γ(L) − (1 − k)L)dG(r|q) − r
ekL− C(q − q0) (5)
83.4 Regulator/Supervisor
The regulator aims at limiting the banks’s moral hazard due to limited lia-
bility. He is assumed to know the functional form of C(e), the relationship
between quality and the bank’s eﬀorts (q = q0 + e), and the impact of q on
G(r). I abstract from information asymmetries. The regulator can, thus,
observe the realization of q0 and the level of eﬀort e.
The regulator uses the capital-asset ratio k and the total realized quality
q as regulatory instruments to deal with the bank’s moral hazard. He will
set both instruments depending on the observed innate quality.
The sequence of actions are described in the following:
Before t0:
• Bank and regulator observe the innate quality of the bank’s assets q0.
At t0:
• Regulator imposes {q(q0),k(q0)} on bank.
• Bank raises equity E and issues deposits D in line with the regulation.
• Bank invests in loans L with the innate quality q0 and exerts eﬀort e.
• Regulator prevents bank from operating if bank violates regulatory
terms.
• If bank abides by regulation, it remains in operation until t1.
At t1:
• Cash ﬂows are realized and distributed in the manner described above.
The supervisor is assumed to have a prudential as well as a systemic
mandate. Prudential supervision consists of a microeconomic approach that
focuses on screening the activity of individual banks with the aim of protect-
ing the assets of banking clients. This last view is the concept predominant in
theory and practice (see, for instance, Dewatripont and Tirole’s (1994) “rep-
resentation hypothesis” according to which the regulator-supervisor’s task is
to protect small and uninformed depositors). Therefore, the supervisor gives
n e g a t i v ew e i g h tt ot h el o s so fd e p o s i t o r si nc a s eo fb a n k r u p t c y .
Systemic supervision is responsible for safeguarding the stability of the
entire banking system. Under a systemic supervisory mandate, banking su-
pervisors are concerned about two key issues: ﬁrst, limiting the risk of ﬁnan-
cial contagion in the banking system that results from the interconnections
9of banking intermediaries, and secondly, isolating the whole economy from
the real impact of systemic instability and failures. Hence, a systemic super-
visor assigns negative value to bank failure as bankruptcy triggers costs for
the banking system and the whole economy. These costs are supposed to be
proportional to the depositors’ loss.
The negative value which the prudential and systemic supervisor assigns




(rL− γ(L) − (1 − k(q0))L)dG(r|q(q0)) (6)
with b>0 reﬂecting the triggered costs above the actual loss to depositors.
Ic a l lb the excess cost factor. The dependence of k and q on the level of
innate quality follows from the fact that the bank abides by the regulation.
Apart from the negative value of possible ﬁnancial distress, the supervisor




[rL− γ(L) − (1 − k(q0))L] (7)
dG(r|q(q0)) − r
ek(q0)L − C(q(q0) − q0).
This expression follows directly from (5) using the fact that the bank’s
operations must be consistent with the regulatory terms. Recall that these
rents reﬂect the bank’s eﬃciency plus the surplus of the companies’ invest-
ment projects.











δ(rL− γ(L) − (1 − k(q0))L)dG(r|q(q0)) (9)
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[1 + b]x for x ≤ 0
x for x>0.
















where rb∗L∗−γ(L∗)−ρ(q∗)(1−k∗)L∗ =0and asterisks indicate optimal levels.
Equations (10) and (11) are obtained by diﬀerentiating (9) with respect to q
and k respectively.8
Equation (10) identiﬁes the ﬁrst-best level of quality for the bank’s loan
portfolio. Increases in quality increase the expected cash ﬂows of the bank
and reduce the probability of failure. At the optimal level of quality, these
marginal gains are equal to the marginal costs of additional quality C0(·).





e − 1.( 1 2 )
The ﬁrst term in (12) measures the expected savings in bankruptcy cost from
increasing the capital-asset ratio. The second term represents the marginal
cost of ﬁnancing an increase in the capital asset ratio. The optimal capital-
asset ratio is given where these two quantities are equated. Apart from
diﬀerences in the costs of equity, debt, and ﬁnancial distress, the bank’s
induced capital structure is, hence, similar to that of any other type of ﬁrm.







From (13), corollary 1 is obvious:
Corollary 1 Given [FOSD] or [SOSD], the equilibrium probability of bank
failure is independent of the level of realized quality.
This may seem surprising as one might expect high-quality banks to ex-
perience bankruptcy less often. However, equity is a substitute for quality in
reducing bankruptcy (see corollary 4). So, the regulator forces low-quality
8As I assume that the lowest quality q is suﬃciently large that it is socially optimal to
have all banks to make loans, I can concentrate on interior solutions.
11banks to have a higher capital-asset ratio. As the marginal cost of increasing
the capital-asset ratio is the same for all banks, the regulator will do so until
the bank has the same probability of failure as a high-quality bank.
Corollary 2 Under [FOSD] or [SOSD], the equilibrium probability of bank






> 0 ∀q0 ∈ [q,q] (14)
at the solution to [RP].
When the cost of equity rises relative to the cost of debt, it becomes more
costly to avoid bankruptcy. Consequently, bankruptcy is permitted to occur
with greater frequency in equilibrium.
Corollary 3 Given [FOSD] or [SOSD], the equilibrium probability of bank







As the excess losses from bankruptcy increase, the regulator will optimally
ensure a reduced incidence of bankruptcy.
To derive additional results in the case of [SOSD], I assume that the single
crossing property (SCP) holds:
(SCP): There exists b r ∈ (r,r) such that Gq(r|q) Q 0 as r Q b r.
Corollary 4 Suppose [FOSD] holds, or [SOSD] and (SCP) hold with rb > b r.
Then the higher the quality of the bank’s portfolio, the lower the required
capital-asset ratio, i.e., dk/dq < 0 at the solution to [RP].










125 Regulation in a Two-Country Setup
In the last section, the optimal regulatory scheme was established which a
regulator-supervisor would choose if he took the negative impact of bank
failure on the banking system and the whole economy into account. Let us
think of him as an EU regulator who is able to fully assess the spillover costs
independent of where the banking problem ﬁrst begins and in which country
the costs accrue. The regulatory scheme derived in the last section could
then be interpreted as the optimal regulation-supervision in the EU as banks
would be forced to internalize the whole negative costs which accrue when
they fail.
Let us assume a setup with two countries A and B. In every country,
there is one bank which represents the national banking system. The terms
”bank” and ”national banking system” are then synonyms. The two banking
systems are assumed to have cross-border linkages via the interbank market.
Country A banks deposit in and take deposits from country B banks and
vice versa. In each country, there is a regulator-supervisor who controls the
national banking system. His national supervisory mandate brings about two
diﬀerences in regulation compared to the case with only one supranational
regulator.
To analytically derive these diﬀerences, let us modify the closed-banking-
system model of the last two sections. In the two-country setup, the level of
realized quality of country A’s banking system does not longer only depend
on innate quality q0,A and eﬀort eA, but also on the level of realized quality
in country B’s banking system qB:
qA =( 1− f)(q0,A + eA)+fqB (15)
where f is the share the home bank invests in the foreign banking system
(0 ≤ f ≤ 1). If the portfolio share of loans to foreign banks is small (low
f), the level of realized quality in country B’s banking system has only a
s m a l li m p a c to nr e a l i z e dq u a l i t yi nc o u n t r yA .F o rt h er e g u l a t o ri nc o u n t r y
A, q0,A + eA and qB are substitutes. Hence, the quality level qA can either
be achieved by loans to companies whose quality the bank can enhance by
exerting eﬀort eA, or by investing in foreign banks with the quality level qB
(which adds the more to the bank’s quality, the higher the banking systems
are integrated).
As discussed above, regulators with a national mandate do not have an
incentive to take international spillovers into account. Recall that this in-
centive contraint is twofold as national supervisors do not take costs into
account which accrue abroad (incentive constraint) and they cannot access
13the riskiness of banks’ activities abroad due to lacking information (informa-
tion constraint). In the two-country setup, the incentive constraint means
that the country A supervisor does not take excess costs of a national bank
breakdown into account which accrue in country B. Hence, the excess cost
factor bA in the regulator’s objective function reﬂects only repercussions on
the national banking system and the home economy. bA is lower than the
excess cost factor in the case of a supranational regulator. With rising in-
tegration of the two markets, the national excess cost factor increasingly
deviates from the supranational one. According to corollary 3, the probabil-
ity of failure would be too high as the bank is not forced to fully internalize
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀects of bankruptcy. The same holds for country B. Thus, the
overall probability of failure is ineﬃciently high compared to the suprana-
tional optimum and is the higher, the more integrated the interbank market
is.
Besides, the information deﬁcit means that country A supervisor does
not know qB and, thus, is unable to assess the bank’s realized quality qA.
However, incorporating imperfect monitoring is tedious and basically pre-
vents supervisors from fully eliminating bank rents. As all qualitative results
continue to hold, I abstain from explicitely modelling this variant and in-
stead refer the interested reader to Lewis and Sappington (1989) who model
imperfect monitoring in a related context.
In summary, a supervisory regime where national supervisors lack infor-
mation on banks’ activities abroad and where they do not take international
spillovers into account is suboptimal: The induced probability of bank failure
is ineﬃciently high. Hence, a mechanism is to be implemented which aligns
the national supervisors’ incentives such that bA fully reﬂects the costs of
bank failure independent of where these costs accrue and such that supervi-
sors are forced to appropriately exchange information. Such a mechanism is
described in the next section.
However, before moving on to the next section, I analyze the eﬀect of
improved information exchange. Using (2) and assuming a mechanism which
implements eﬃcient information exchange among supervisor in country A
and B, the implicit deﬁnition of equilibrium probability of failure (13) be-
comes
G(
(1 − k∗)L + γ(L)
L







A is the optimally induced eﬀort of bank A.
As can be seen above, the quality of banking system B can partly sub-
stitute for costly eﬀort of banking system A. The same quality level can,
14thus, be realized with lower costs to banking system A. The optimally in-
duced level of realized quality qA increases until the marginal gains are equal
to the marginal costs of additional realized quality qA (see ﬁrst-order condi-
tion (10)). A higher quality level corresponds to a lower capital-asset ratio
(see Corollary 4). The rise in quality and the drop in the capital-asset ratio
increase with the integration of the two banking systems. The same holds
true for country B. When country B banks fund country A banks via the
interbank market, qA can partly substitute for eB. qB rises and kB falls.
Higher realized quality in country B increases realized quality in A which
has a positive repercussion on quality in country B and so forth. This positive
interconnection does not lead to a conﬂict between national supervisors.9
However, supervisors use the higher quality level to lower the required capital-
asset ratio. Hence, integration leads to a higher realized quality and a lower
capital-asset ratio. These two eﬀects compensate for each other so that the
probability of failure remains on an ineﬃciently low level in the two-country
setup due to the national supervisors’ lacking incentives to internalize foreign
spillovers.10
To sum up, for a regulatory regime to be eﬃcient, it has to force na-
tional supervisors to exchange information on the activity of banks in the
host country and to take costs into account which accrue abroad. In this
framework, eﬃcient information exchange does not lead to a strategic game
in which national supervisors play against eachother, but rather provide the
basis for supervisors to implement an eﬃcient regime.
6 Optimal Supervision in the EU
The ineﬃciently low probability of failure in the two-country setup derives
from the fact that supervisors do not take foreign spillovers into account
which are the result of a national bank’s breakdown. This is due to the
regulators’ incentives set by their national mandates. The same holds for
9I abstract here from reputational losses which accrue to supervisors in case of bank-
ruptcy. The reputational losses would accrue as the respective supervisor would obviously
not have been successful in preventing bankruptcy. The supervisor would, thus, be reluc-
tant to reveal information on problems of home banks as long as there is the chance that
the problems would only be of temporary nature. For a model of conﬂicts of interest in
the supervision of multinational banks in a related context see Holthausen and Roende
(2002).
10However, if the marginal cost of equity were strictly increasing in equity E, re would be
lower in the two-country setup as the required capital-asset ratio k is lower (see corollary
2). Hence, the probability of failure his lower which mitigates the problem due to the
supervisors’ incentive deﬁcit.
15ineﬃcient exchange of information. Hence, the solution consists of changing
their incentives such that they consider the negative repercussions abroad.
In practice, EU legislation has eliminated legal barriers to the exchange
of information between national supervisory authorities, opening up the op-
portunity of cooperation. The common device of organizing cooperation on a
bilateral basis are voluntary Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), already in
place between many national supervisory authorities in the EU (see section
2). However, the network of bilateral MoUs does not properly align super-
visors’ incentives as they fail to force supervisors to exchange information
in a timely and adequate manner.11 This is due to their implicit character
without a proper sanction mechanism.
As centralization on the EU level does not seem to be politically feasible
at the time being, a suitable approach seems to strengthen coordination of
national supervisory authorities beyond the existing system of MoUs.12 I
suggest to implement coordination in the form of a ”Supervisory Coordina-
tion Authority” on the EU level.13 National supervisory authorities would
then be accountable to this new institution.14 The institution would evaluate
the national supervisory process and could intervene when national and in-
ternational interests come into conﬂict with each other. For its interventions
to be credible and eﬀective, the ”Supervisory Coordination Authority” would
have the right to levy sanctions against the national supervisory authorities
which do not comply with the supranational rules.
However, countries are always hesitant to transfer rights to the suprana-
tional level. Hence, in order to ﬁnd political approval, such a new institution
could build on existing EU instances which may have already established a
reputation in the ﬁeld of supervision. The instances which come into ques-
tion are the Groupe de Contact, the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC),
and the Banking Advisory Committee (BAC). The Groupe de Contact is a
forum of supervisory experts for the exchange of views on individual institu-
tions and market developments and the assessment of trends in the banking
sector. The BSC is based at the European Central Bank. It has a double
mandate from the Governing Council, i.e. (1) to assist the European Sys-
tem of Central Banks in contributing to the measures undertaken by the
11See Enria and Vesala (2002) for further details on the incentive constraints of MoUs.
12For arguments regarding a supranational approach to supervision in the EU see Lannoo
(2000) and Speyer (2001).
13For a related paper see N’Daw (2001), who proposes to institutionalize peer-monitoring
among national supervisors in the EU in order to overcome incentive and information
deﬁcits.
14For the related discussion on the political accountability of the supervisory authority
see Quintyn and Taylor (2002).
16competent authorities in the ﬁeld of prudential supervision of banks and the
stability of the ﬁnancial system, and (2) to provide a multilateral forum for
t h ee x c h a n g eo fi n f o r m a t i o na n dc o o p e ration between banking supervisors
of diﬀerent member states. The BAC is based at the European Commission
a n dp r o m o t e sc o o p e r a t i o nb e t w e e nt h eE u r o s y s t e ma n db a n k i n gs u p e r v i s o r y
authorities.
Although there are certainly many strong points in favor of each insti-
tution, I argue in favor of the BSC as location of the new ”Supervisory
Coordination Authority”. Firstly, in contrast to the Groupe de Contact, it is
based on EU legislation and already reﬂects a minimum consensus among na-
tional banking supervisors. Secondly, although both the BSC and the BAC
promote cooperation between the Eurosystem and national supervisors, the
BSC additionally deals with market and regulatory developments which are
of importance for the EMU banking system. Besides, the BSC’s experience
with the preparation of national banking legislation argues for its role in the
diﬀusion of sound supervisory practices.15
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I show how a supervisor should optimally employ risk-adjusted
capital-asset ratios to maximize social welfare. The supervisory authority is
concerned with the costs of bank failure which accrue in the form of losses to
depositors and negative repercussions on other banks and the whole economy.
In the integrated EU banking system, a bank breakdown in one country will
trigger some of these costs in another country. With a national mandate, su-
pervisors do not take these spillovers into account. From an EU perspective,
supervision will not be optimal as the probability of bank failure will be too
high throughout Europe.
I argue that the current bilateral cooperation in the form of Memoranda
of Understanding is not able to eliminate the supervisory incentive deﬁcit.
Further tightening of coordination is needed in order to make supervisors con-
sider international spillovers. I argue in favor of transforming the ECB-based
Banking Supervision Committee into a ”Supervisory Coordination Author-
ity” to which national supervisors are accountable.
15I do not argue for or against allocating supervision with the central bank. If the
BSC got the supervisory mandate, it could then also be outsourced to an independent
institution. See, for instance, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993), Goodhart and Schoen-
maker (1995), Haubrich (1996), Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999), Goodhart (2000),
and Barth et al. (2001) for the debate on whether the monetary policy mandate should be
separated from the supervisory mandate. Hawkesby (2001) includes cost-beneﬁte l e m e n t s
and country-speciﬁc factors into the discussion.
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